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THE DOCTRINE OF BENEFIT AND BURDEN: REFORMING THE LAW OF COVENANTS 
AND THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS “PROBLEM” 
 
Christopher Bevan* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT. The doctrine of benefit and burden - an indirect method for enforcing the burden of 
positive freehold covenants – developed as an exception the strict Austerberry rule that the burden 
of positive covenants cannot bind successors directly at law. Three recent Court of Appeal cases 
(Davies v Jones; Wilkinson v Kerdene and Elwood v Goodman) confirm the continued existence 
and application of the doctrine but also reveal its deficiencies and limitations. This article explores 
the contemporary application of the doctrine, identifies its theoretical, historical and elemental 
frailty and, drawing on recent reform proposals of the Law Commission, highlights the case for 
reform. In so doing, this article argues that a vital theoretical issue has been overlooked in the 
reform debate: the numerus clausus principle. 
 
KEYWORDS: property; benefit and burden; freehold covenants; positive obligations; numerus 
clausus 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the early 19th century, freehold covenants have occupied a central place in property law and 
continue to do so today. How and in what circumstances landowners and those acquiring land are 
bound by freehold covenants therefore really matters. It matters because whether land is burdened 
by a freehold covenant can have significant ramifications not just for the use to which the land can 
be put but also for its economic value, its saleability and its amenity. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, 
strict rules have developed as to when freehold covenants will and will not be binding under 
English and Wales law. One intriguing and rather anomalous “workaround” to these often-harsh 
rules is the so-called “doctrine of benefit and burden”. It is this “enforceability question” and the 
doctrine of benefit and burden in particular which form the focus of this article. This article revisits 
the origins and development of the doctrine and scrutinises its contemporary application in order 
to unearth a new perspective on the Law Commission’s recent proposals for reform to the law of 
covenants which would see the introduction of an entirely new proprietary right, the “Land 
Obligation”. In so doing, the theoretical and historical fragility of the doctrine of benefit and 
burden is exposed thus buttressing the case for reform. Yet, it is argued here that, if the 
Commission’s significant reform proposals are to be accepted, a stronger and more convincing 
case must be made as why the established, closed list of proprietary rights (the so-termed “numerus 
clausus”) should be opened and expanded. This article explores the inherent difficulties of this 
commonly-overlooked numerus clausus “problem” and reflects on how it might be overcome and 
accommodated within the Commission’s reform agenda. 
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The Law Commission estimates that around 80% of land in England and Wales is subject to at 
least one freehold covenant.1 A freehold covenant is simply a promise made in a deed. A positive 
freehold covenant is a promise in a deed by one freehold land owner (the covenantor) with another 
freehold owner (the covenantee) whereby the former promises to actively do something on or in 
relation to his land for the benefit of the latter such as the planting of trees, the painting of fencing 
or the payment of a contribution to the maintenance of a road. The covenantor is the party subject 
to the burden of the promise; the covenantee enjoys the benefit of that promise. Freehold covenants 
are therefore an important means by which landowners can achieve a more particularised, bespoke 
control, management and ultimately enjoyment of their own land. 
Freehold covenants are, first and foremost, contracts and are therefore necessarily binding 
between the original parties to the covenant deed. However, they may, if certain conditions are 
met, also be enforceable by and against successors in title of these original parties. This makes 
covenants extremely potent proprietary rights in land. It is vital, then, that the circumstances and 
conditions under which successors in title of the original parties will be bound by these covenants 
is determined and delimited with clarity. Whilst the starting point remains the strict doctrine of 
privity of contract, it has been settled since the fourteenth century2 that, in certain situations, the 
benefit of a positive freehold covenant is capable of running with an estate in land and therefore 
binding a successor in title. More controversial, however, is the position regarding the burden of 
positive covenants. Whilst equity has recognised, since Tulk v Moxhay,3 that the burden of a 
negative, restrictive covenant (a promise not to do something on land) can run with the land and 
so bind successors, the burden of a positive freehold covenant at law cannot bind successors 
directly.4 This rule has been affirmed and re-affirmed by the courts on several occasions from 
Keppell v Bailey,5 famously in Austerberry v Corporation of Oldham6 and more recently in the 
House of Lords in Rhone v Stephens.7 
The doctrine of mutual benefit and burden, which forms the subject of this article, therefore 
developed as an indirect method by which, at law and despite the Austerberry rule, the burden of 
positive freehold covenants can run with the land and so be enforceable against successors. Yet 
this doctrine, described by Wade as an “innovation of considerable potentiality”8 and said to “give 
expression to a broad principle of justice”9 that he who takes the benefit of a grant must also bear 
the burden, is deeply elusive. This article seeks to cast light on and scrutinize this doctrine and 
contribute to a field of surprisingly sparse academic scholarship. The doctrine of benefit and 
burden stands as an exception or “workaround” to the established Austerberry rule yet the precise 
ambit of the doctrine has received very little academic attention since its enunciation in Halsall v 
                                                
1 Law Commission, Easements, Covenants and Profits à Prendre: A Consultation Paper (2008) 
(Law Com. Report No. 186). 
2 Pakenham’s Case (1369) Y B 42 Edw III Hil, pl 14, f 3; see A.W.B. Simpson, A History of Land 
Law 2nd ed., (London 1986), 116-118. 
3 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph. 774, 41 E.R. 1143. 
4 Austerberry v Oldham Corporation (1885) 29 Ch. D. 750. 
5 Keppell v Bailey (1834) 2 My. & K. 517, 39 E.R. 1042. 
6 Austerberry v Corporation of Oldham (1885) 29 Ch. D. 750; see also Haywood v The 
Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society (1885) 8 Q.B.D. 403. 
7 Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 A.C. 310; [1994] 2 All E.R. 65. 
8 H.W.R. Wade, “Covenants – a broad and reasonable view” [1972] C.L.J. 157, at p. 158. 
9 K. Gray and S. F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed., (Oxford, 2009), at [3.3.35]. 
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Brizell.10 This article fills this gap and comes, crucially, after a triptych recent decisions of the 
Court of Appeal which have sought to further delimit the doctrine: Davies v Jones;11 Wilkinson v 
Kerdene12 and Elwood v Goodman.13 This article seeks to do four things: first, it offers an 
examination of the origins and development of the doctrine of benefit and burden. Secondly, it 
locates and evaluates the scope of the doctrine in contemporary property law in view of recent case 
law developments. Thirdly, and in so doing, it reveals the theoretical, historical and elemental 
frailty of the doctrine which, finally, and in turn, it will be argued enlarges and bolsters the case 
for reform of the law of covenants and the reform agenda of the Law Commission. Crucially, this 
article examines a severely overlooked issue for reform of the law in this area: the numerus clausus 
principle. This article therefore employs analysis of the doctrine of benefit and burden as a prism 
through which to assess the Commission’s significant reform proposals as well as consideration 
of how the numerus clausus “problem” impacts upon and must be accommodated within the 
proposed reform agenda. 
 
 
II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF BENEFIT AND 
BURDEN 
 
It is only by first revisiting the origins and development of the doctrine of benefit and burden that 
we can then move meaningfully to analyse and assess its contemporary status and, ultimately, to 
probe the cogency of the Law Commission’s recent reform agenda. The doctrine of benefit and 
burden has evolved piecemeal through case law and has undoubtedly been shaped incrementally 
throughout its historical development. As such, it cannot be fully understood without examining 
its inception, adoption and early application by the courts. An appreciation of the provenance and 
early exposition of the doctrine is therefore critical. This is addressed in this section. The House 
of Lords in Austerberry v Corporation of Oldham confirmed that the burden of positive freehold 
covenants cannot run with the fee simple at common law. Thus, a landowner in whose favour a 
positive covenant has been extracted will not, at law, be able to enforce the burden of the covenant 
directly against a successor of the original covenantor. Freehold contracts are contractual rights. 
There is no privity of estate between the successor of the original covenantor and the original 
covenantee and so the burden of the covenant cannot pass with the land.14 This strict position has 
represented the law for over a century and was confirmed more recently by the House of Lords in 
Rhone v Stephens15 where Lord Templeman noted that: 
For over 100 years it has been clear and accepted law that equity will enforce negative 
covenants against freehold land but has no power to enforce positive covenants against 
successors in title of the land. To enforce a positive covenant would be to enforce a personal 
                                                
10 Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch. 169; [1957] 1 All E.R. 371 ; see C. Davis, “The Principle of Benefit 
and Burden” [1998] C.L.J. 522. 
11 Davies v Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 1164; [2009] All ER (D) 104. 
12 Wilkinson v Kerdene [2013] EWCA Civ 44; [2013] 2 E.G.L.R. 163. 
13 Elwood v Goodman [2013] EWCA Civ 1103; [2013] 4 All E.R. 1077. 
14 See Megarry and Wade. C. Harpum, S. Bridge and M. Dixon, Megarry & Wade: The Law of 
Real Property, 8th ed., (London 2012). 
15 On which see generally J. Snape, ‘The Burden of Positive Covenants” [1994] Conv. 477; N. 
Gravells, “Enforcement of positive covenants affecting freehold land” (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 346. 
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obligation against a person who has not covenanted. To enforce negative covenants is only 
to treat the land as subject to a restriction.16 
The rule has deep roots17 and remains in place today albeit that a number of ingenious devices 
have been concocted by conveyancers to avoid the harshness of the effects of the Austerberry rule. 
These “indirect” methods (of which the doctrine of benefit and burden is one18) allow for 
enforcement of the burdens of positive freehold covenants and are a response to the “illogical, 
uncertain, incomplete and inflexible”19 law in this area. The inability for the burdens of positive 
covenants to pass at law has long been a source of ire and the direct enforcement of positive 
covenants has been recommended in consecutive Law Commission reports going back to the 
1960s.20 The Commission in 1984, by way of example, located the Austerberry rule as the “main 
defect in the present law” and described it as “of course both simple and devastating.”21 The most 
recent recommendations for reform are those contained in the 2011 Report No. 327 Making Land 
Work: Easements, Covenants and Profits à Prendre and are discussed further below. In the face 
of Parliamentary inertia, the Austerberry rule endures for the foreseeable future at least and thus 
the indirect methods of enforcement of burdens of positive covenants remain significant and are 
worthy of scrutiny. Perhaps the most controversial and least explored is the doctrine of benefit and 
burden. 
 The doctrine was first applied by Upjohn J. in the case of Halsall v Brizell.22 In Halsall, land 
was subdivided and sold as plots for redevelopment. The vendors retained ownership of the roads, 
sewers, sea wall and promenade but granted rights to the purchasers to make use of these facilities. 
The purchasers covenanted to make a contribution to the cost of maintaining these facilities. Under 
the Austerberry rule, the burden of these positive covenants could not pass to the purchasers 
directly at law. Nevertheless, the court held that the purchasers were required to make the 
contribution if they wished to take advantage of the facilities. This principle, said the court, sprung 
from an “ancient law” of reciprocal benefits and burdens: a man could not take the benefit under 
a deed without also accepting its obligations.23 The doctrine was subsequently applied in Ives v 
                                                
16 Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 A.C. 310 at 321 per Lord Templeman. 
17 See discussion in Law Commission, Making Land Work: Easements, Covenants and Profits à 
Prendre (Law Com. Report No.327) at [5.12]-[5.16]. 
18 Other methods include the use of leasehold title; a chain of indemnity covenants; estate 
rentcharges and commonhold.  
19 Law Commission, Appurtenant Rights (1971) (Law Com. Report. W.P. No. 36) at [31]-[35]. 
20 Report of the Committee on Positive Covenants Affecting Land (1965), Cmnd. 2719; Law 
Commission, Restrictive Covenants (1967) (Law Com. Report. No. 11), Law Commission, 
Appurtenant Rights (1971) (Law Com. Report. W.P. No. 36); Law Commission, Positive and 
Restrictive Covenants (1984) (Law Com. Report. No. 127); Report of the Aldridge Working Party 
on Commonhold (1987) Cm. 179; Lord Chancellor's Consultation Paper on Commonhold (1990) 
Cm. 1345. 
21 Law Commission, Positive and Restrictive Covenants (1984) (Law Com. Report. No. 127) 
22 Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch. 169; [1957] 1 All E.R. 371. 
23 In the event, the contribution was held to be void on the basis that it represented more than a 
“due and just proportion” of the upkeep of the facilities: Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch. 169 at pp.183-
4 per Upjohn J. 
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High24 where Lord Denning M.R. explained the doctrine of benefit and burden in the simplest of 
terms: “He who takes the benefit must accept the burden … a party cannot enjoy the benefits of 
an arrangement without giving effect to the burdens imposed on such benefits.”25 The “universe” 
of the doctrine was expanding26 in that, in Ives, the principle was applied to a parol agreement. In 
Ives, successors in title erected a block of flats whose foundations reached into neighbouring land. 
It was agreed orally between the parties that the foundations could remain in place and that the 
defendant would be given a right of way to enable access to the yard at the back of the flats. 
According to Lord Denning M.R., the doctrine of benefit and burden applied even though there 
was no agreement by deed. A decade later in Tito v Waddell (No.2),27 Megarry V-C. revisited the 
doctrine and drawing on Halsall and Ives identified what he coined the “pure principle of benefit 
and burden” doctrine. Megarry V-C. made plain that this principle was to be regarded as distinct 
from the “conditional benefit principle”. Under the conditional benefit principle, as a matter of 
construction, there is a grant of rights whose enjoyment is conditional upon or qualified by the 
assumption of a burden.28 Under the “pure principle of benefit and burden”, the burden is 
independent from and is not a condition of the grant. The burden must be shown to have intended 
to pass with the benefit and, additionally, that a “sufficient benefit” has been taken. Megarry V-C. 
explained: 
 
[T]here is ample authority for holding that there has become established in the law what I 
have called the pure principle of benefit and burden. Second, I also think that this principle 
is distinct from the conditional benefit cases, and cases of burdens annexed to property … A 
burden that has been made a condition of the benefit, or is annexed to property, simply passes 
with it: if you take the benefit or the property you must take it as it stands, with all its 
appendages, good or bad. It is only where the benefit and the burden are independent that 
the pure principle of benefit and burden can apply … [this] is a question of construction of 
the instrument or transaction, depending on the intention that has been manifested in it, 
whether or not it has created a conditional benefit or a burden annexed to property.29 
 
Certain issues remained unresolved,30 in particular, as to the dividing line between the “pure” and 
the “conditional” principles. In Rhone v Stephens,31 the House of Lords revisited this “pure 
principle” with Lord Templeman casting significant doubt on Megarry’s interpretation, noting that 
he was “not prepared to recognise the ‘pure principle’ that any party deriving any benefit from a 
                                                
24 Ives v High (1967) 2 Q.B. 379. 
25 Ibid. at pp. 394, 400. 
26 Gray and Gray describe the “expanding universe” of the doctrine in its early development: note 
9 above at para. [3.3.35]. 
27 Tito v Waddell (No.2) [1977] Ch. 106; [1977] 3 All E.R. 129 on which see generally: Crane 
(1977); Aughterson [1985] Conv. 12.  
28 Tito v Waddell (No.2) [1977] Ch. at 290. 
29 Ibid. at p. 302. 
30 On which see Aughterson [1985] Conv. 12, at 16. 
31 Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 A.C. 310; [1994] 2 All E.R. 65 ; on which see: L. Tee, “A Roof Too 
Far” [1994] C.L.J. 423, 446; A. Jones, “Thinking positively about the law of covenants?” (1994-
5) 5 K.C.L.J. 136; J. Snape, “The benefit and burden of covenants – now where are we?” (1994) 
3 Nottingham Law Journal 68. 
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conveyance must accept any burden in the same conveyance.”32 In truth, Lord Templeman’s 
construction of the Tito decision was itself a broad-brush gloss of the lengthy discussion in that 
case and did not do justice to Megarry’s distinction between pure and conditional benefits. 
Nevertheless, Lord Templeman went on to affirm the decision in Halsall and so the doctrine of 
benefit and burden endures albeit that the “pure” nomenclature has been dropped. In essence, the 
doctrine was recast in Rhone and, as Lord Templeman explained, the doctrine was to be 
constrained in view of the continuing potency of the Austerberry rule which was affirmed. So 
when would the doctrine of benefit and burden operate? First, Lord Templeman explained that it 
was not the case that any burden would be enforceable simply by attaching it to a right. The burden 
had to be relevant to the exercise of the right for the doctrine to apply. In other words, only 
reciprocal benefits and burdens would be enforceable. Secondly, the doctrine would only operate 
where there was an opportunity to renounce the benefit and thereby escape the linked burden. The 
principle therefore did not apply on the facts of Rhone itself which was a case in which the owners 
of dwelling house whose roof extended over an adjoining cottage could neither in theory nor in 
practice refuse to repair the roof and so be deprived of the benefit of mutual rights of support. By 
contrast, in Halsall, the defendant could “in theory at least” elect between paying the contribution 
towards maintenance of the facilities and forsaking the right to use them and thereby save the 
money. The effect of the decision in Rhone was therefore to affirm Halsall but also to acknowledge 
that there needed to be limitations on the operation of the principle of benefit and burden. The two 
conditions for the operation of the doctrine, namely the requirement of (i) “relevance” between 
benefit and burden, and (ii) the opportunity to renounce the benefit and eschew the burden were 
subsequently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Thamesmead v Allotey.33 The doctrine’s status 
had therefore been affirmed but curtailed and bounded. Despite the discussion of the parameters 
of the doctrine in Rhone and Allotey, how the doctrine would operate across distinct factual 
nexuses remained unclear. This is unsurprising. The doctrine of mutual benefit and burden is a 
principle whose limits have never been clear. In Tito and Rhone themselves, there was a 
recognition of the haziness and mysterious nature of the doctrine: Megarry V-C., for example, 
conceding that “the full features of the principle” remained to be worked out. Since then, this has 
been the task embarked upon by the courts and one which still occupies the judiciary in a recent 
triptych of decisions of the Court of Appeal. The doctrine has, in fact, been subjected to very little 
close analysis by the court and is applied relatively sparingly. Fortunately, a series of recent cases, 
offers a useful moment to consider the contemporary scope of the doctrine and how the courts are 
defining its operation. 
 
 
III. THE CONTEMPORARY SCOPE AND EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF BENEFIT 
AND BURDEN 
 
 This section examines the contemporary operation of the doctrine of benefit and burden as 
applied in three recent Court of Appeal decisions: Davies, Wilkinson and Elwood. This analysis 
confirms the continued utility and value of the doctrine but also, importantly, reveals a notable 
narrowing in the doctrine’s scope which, in turn, highlights the deficiencies and brings into sharp 
focus the indeterminacy of the doctrine. This section begins by reflecting on the three recent 
                                                
32 Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 A.C. at p. 322. 
33 Thamesmead v Allotey [1998] EWCA Civ 15; (1998) 30 H.L.R. 1052. 
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decisions and assesses how the doctrine operated and was circumscribed in each and what these 
cases have to tell us about the doctrine’s current status and its future. 
Davies34 in the Court of Appeal offered a long-overdue opportunity to re-consider the scope of 
the doctrine. Davies concerned a dispute arising from a contract for sale of land to a supermarket 
for redevelopment. The supermarket, Lidl, entered a contract to purchase a site from Mr Jones that 
it wished to develop into a new store. At the time, freehold to the land was vested in the claimants, 
Davies, who were trustees of a retirement benefit scheme but also to a lesser extent in Mr and Mrs 
Thomas. Mr Jones contracted with Mr and Mrs Thomas to purchase that part vested in them (the 
“Jones-Thomas Contract”) and, subsequently, contracted to purchase the larger, remaining part 
vested in the claimants, Davies (the “Jones-Trustees Contract”). Mr Jones later assigned his right, 
title and interest in both the “Jones-Thomas” and “Jones-Trustees” contracts to Lidl. The contracts 
were completed by Mr and Mrs Thomas and the claimants transferring the land directly to Lidl. 
By way of clause 18 of the “Jones-Trustees Contract”, Mr Jones was permitted to retain £100,000 
of the purchase price payable to the claimants, Davies, until clearance and preparation work on the 
site had been carried out. The cost of these works was to be shared jointly by Jones and Davies 
with Jones entitled to retain half of the proper costs from the £100,000 retention. The remaining 
balance was then to be released to Davies. The works were completed but no retention money at 
all was paid to the claimants, Davies. Davies, contended that the true cost had been just £30,000 
and sought the release of the sum retained by Lidl. Lidl argued the works had, in fact, cost in 
excess of £200,000 and that it was not bound by clause 18 of the contract between Mr Jones and 
Davies. 
At first instance, it was held that Lidl was bound by the terms of clause 18 as, having taken the 
benefit of the contract between Mr Jones and Davies, it was bound to accept the burden and 
therefore comply with clause 18 under the doctrine of benefit and burden. The judge found that: 
 
[T]here was a clear understanding that … the rights of Mr Jones under his contract with 
[Davies] would be given to Lidl. There was a clear benefit to them of that operation. It gave 
them the likelihood of completion without going through the intermediary of Mr Jones and 
being left perhaps with a worthless judgment in damages … It seems to me that they did have 
a choice whether to take that benefit or not. That was the basis of the correspondence between 
the parties’ solicitors from July. They had a choice to continue the sub purchaser 
arrangement. They had no need, from a legal point of view, to deal directly with the trustee’s 
solicitors but that they did … Having taken the benefit of that arrangement, in respect of the 
contract in question, in my judgment, they are bound by the burden under it to pay the 
£100,000.35 
 
Lidl appealed to the Court of Appeal arguing that the doctrine of benefit and burden had been 
wrongly applied. In particular, it argued that a “clear understanding” was not a sufficient basis for 
operation of the doctrine; the benefit conferred on Lidl was unconditional and, finally, that in any 
event, Lidl had no choice whether or not to accept or refuse the benefit and thereby avoid the 
burden. This case therefore gave the Court of Appeal an opportunity to rule on and clarify the 
scope of the doctrine. Lidl’s appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal holding that the doctrine of 
benefit and burden did not apply on the basis of a “clear understanding” alone. Where land was 
                                                
34 Davies v Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 1164; [2009] All E.R. (D) 104. 
35 Ibid., at para. [6]. 
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concerned, said Sir Andrew Morritt C., a deed or other writing was required. The “clear 
understanding” identified by the judge was insufficient. The deed of assignment conferred the 
benefit but did not impose any burden and so could not be relied upon here. The doctrine did not 
therefore operate. Sir Andrew Moritt C., having reviewed the authorities, distilled the 
contemporary scope of the doctrine into three requirements which represent a re-working of the 
two factors laid down by the House of Lords in Rhone:36 
 
1. The benefit and burden must be conferred in or by the same transaction; 
2. The receipt or enjoyment of the benefit must be relevant to the imposition of the burden in the 
sense that the former must be conditional on or reciprocal to the latter: this is a matter of 
construction of any deed or document in the case; 
3. The person on whom the burden is alleged to have been imposed must have or have had the 
opportunity of rejecting or disclaiming the benefit, not merely the right to receive the benefit. 
 
Davies therefore represents a narrowing of the doctrine by making clear that it will not apply based 
alone upon an “understanding” between the parties however “clear” that may be in the view. What 
is required is a deed or other writing. This reflects a tightening, a constraining of the doctrine from 
its earlier, more flexible operation. In particular, it signals a shift away from the decision of Ives 
where the doctrine was held to apply to a parol agreement. Davies further establishes that the 
benefit and burden must be conferred in the same transaction. This requirement will be determined 
in most cases by construing the deed effecting the conveyance and associated documents. The 
second requirement that the benefit be “relevant to the imposition of the burden” has been held to 
be “a matter of substance rather than form.”37 The effect of this is that the benefit does not need to 
be expressed in the deed to be conditional upon the burden provided there is a clear and obvious 
link between the two. By far the most uncertain aspect of the doctrine is the second factor 
identified, namely, the requirement of “relevance”; that the benefit and burden must be relevant, 
related, linked to one another. A measure of guidance is provided by the two subsequent decisions 
of the Court of Appeal in Wilkinson v Kerdene and Elwood v Goodman. 
 In Wilkinson v Kerdene, Mr Wilkinson purchased a bungalow situated in a holiday village. 
Under Schedule 1 of the conveyance, Mr Wilkinson was granted rights of use of the roads, 
footpaths, lawns and recreational facilities in the village and, under clause 4 of the conveyance, 
the vendor covenanted to maintain the roads, drives, car parking spaces, footpaths, lawns, 
recreational facilities and paint the external surfaces of the bungalow. The holiday village fell into 
disrepair and ultimately came into new ownership under Kerdene Ltd. Kerdene sought to enforce 
the covenants in order to recover from Mr Wilkinson (and other bungalow owners) the sums it had 
paid in seeking to restore the amenity of the village. As Mr Wilkinson was a successor in title to 
the original purchaser, the burden of the positive covenant could not be enforced directly at law. 
Mr Wilkinson could therefore only be required to pay if the doctrine of benefit and burden applied. 
Mr Wilkinson argued that the payment covenant was linked to the obligation to repair under clause 
4 rather than to the grant of rights under Sch.1. The judge rejected this argument, holding that the 
payment provision was relevant to and correlated with the right to use the facilities broadly drawn. 
                                                
36 Ibid., at para. [27]. 
37 Patten L.J. in Elwood v Goodman [2013] EWCA Civ 1103; [2013] 4 All E.R. 1077. 
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The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding and dismissed Mr Wilkinson’s appeal. 
According to Patten L.J.: 
 
[I]n substance, the payment of an annual charge for the maintenance of facilities which the 
defendants are only entitled to use by virtue of rights granted under the deed is relevant to 
the continued exercise of those rights even though it is in fact (and in terms) a contribution 
to the cost of their maintenance. The two are not inconsistent. Quite the contrary.38 
 
Mr Wilkinson could only escape paying the contribution if it could be shown that the payment had 
no relation to the rights to use the facilities of the village as provided for in Schedule 1. On the 
facts, the payment was clearly relevant to these rights even though exercise of these rights was not 
made expressly conditional on payment. 
 The approach taken in Davies and Wilkinson was subsequently affirmed in Goodman v 
Elwood. In Goodman, the owner of an industrial estate in Nottingham, Dobson, leased industrial 
plots to several tenants who subsequently formed a consortium to purchase the units. In September 
1986, Elwood purchased land on the estate including the access road. Dobson reserved for itself, 
its successors in title, their tenants and licensees, a right of way over the road. In return, Dobson 
covenanted to make a contribution towards maintenance of the road. In December 1986, Dobson 
sold a single unit on the estate to Goodman and as part of the conveyance, Goodman covenanted 
to pay a proportion of Dobson’s contribution to the maintenance of the access road. Elwood 
subsequently sued Goodman to recover unpaid maintenance contributions and, additionally, 
claiming that Goodman was liable to contribute to an extension to the road by one metre instigated 
by Elwood. Applying the doctrine of benefit and burden as clarified in Davies and Wilkinson, the 
Court of Appeal held that Goodman was liable to contribute “a fair and reasonable proportion”39 
of the maintenance costs which was to be calculated by reference to the portion of land Goodman’s 
unit abutted. Patten L.J. observed that: 
 
As … pointed out in Wilkinson v Kerdene Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 44 at [27], the 
requirement for the rights to be conditional on the performance of the payment obligations 
is a matter of substance rather than form and in this case there is a clear and obvious link 
between the rights of way reserved over the Roadway … and the obligation to contribute to 
the cost of repairs.40 
 
Counsel for Goodman had advanced two grounds on which it was contended that the doctrine of 
benefit and burden did not apply. First, it had been argued that any liability arising was personal 
in nature only and further liability had been excluded by the terms of the conveyance. On a true 
construction of that conveyance, this argument was rejected by the court. There was nothing to 
support the submission that liability was to be personal only. Secondly, it was submitted that there 
was a “mismatch” between the rights granted and the scope of the maintenance covenant. The 
rights of way granted under the conveyance were said to be in general terms over all the estate 
roads of the industrial park, whereas the covenant to contribute to the cost of road maintenance 
extended only to a specific part of the access roadway. On this basis, the doctrine should not 
                                                
38 Wilkinson v Kerdene [2013] EWCA Civ 44; [2013] 2 E.G.L.R. 163, at [28]. 
39 Elwood v Goodman [2013] EWCA Civ 1103; [2013] 4 All E.R. 1077, at [16]. 
40 Ibid., at para. [28]. 
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operate, argued counsel for Goodman. This was also rejected. The court found the right of way 
was relevant to the burden of the covenant. The answer, said, the court was to require payment of 
a fair and reasonable proportion of the maintenance cost referable to the specific portion of 
roadway over which rights were enjoyed. Further, it did not matter that the burden of the positive 
covenant had not been registered as the burden of a positive covenant does not create an estate or 
interest in land as do restrictive covenants and Goodman was not to be expected to contribute to 
the costs of the road extension. Given Goodman enjoyed no right to use the road extension, there 
was no inextricably linked benefit and burden.41 
 The Court of Appeal decisions in Davies, Wilkinson and Elwood offer an important moment 
to re-evaluate and re-appraise the doctrine of benefit and burden. These cases raise three key 
observations. First and importantly, the decisions confirm that the doctrine of benefit and burden 
endures, it continues to exist and play a role in contemporary property law jurisprudence. Simply 
stated, the doctrine still matters. Suggestions of the doctrine dying out and its demise are therefore 
disproved.42 Secondly, whilst the doctrine persists, taken-together, the recent decisions of the court 
reflect a narrowing of the doctrine’s scope; a trend which is discernible from the decision Rhone 
onwards. To re-formulate the language of Gray and Gray, the “universe” of the doctrine is today 
far less extensive than witnessed in its early incarnations under Tito, Halsall and Ives. The doctrine 
is therefore more clearly constrained, bounded and appears to be narrowing with each judgment. 
Thirdly, the combination of the first and second of these observations gives expression to the third. 
The recent flurry of cases confirms the survival of the doctrine, the continuing desire for the burden 
of positive freehold covenants to bind successors but also it underscores the deficiencies and 
limitations of the doctrine as a means of achieving this end. This, it is argued, necessitates enquiry 
into why the doctrine exists by locating, critiquing and probing its underpinning, its rationale. This 
forms the subject of the next section. 
 
 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF BENEFIT AND BURDEN: LOCATING A CONVINCING 
RATIONALE 
 
Despite the doctrine of benefit and burden having been applied in a range of decided cases, the 
doctrine rests on surprisingly unsteady doctrinal foundations. Thus, while the court from Halsall 
to Tito, from Rhone to the recent triptych of Court of Appeal judgments, have accepted the 
existence of the doctrine, there has been very little attempt to clarify or probe its rationale or to 
interrogate the case for its continued justification. Delving more deeply exposes that the principle, 
in fact, springs from less than settled doctrinal beginnings and has a more uncertain, contested 
history than textbooks and practitioner texts would suggest. This is important because it goes to 
the legitimacy of the principle, its continued currency in property law and vitally to its doctrinal 
force more broadly. A case must be made for the continued existence of the doctrine. A convincing 
rationale must be located and established. With this in mind, and given that this article ultimately 
moves to suggest a new underpinning for the passing of mutual benefits and burdens, it is 
necessary to first consider the foundations of the doctrine and why it exists. 
                                                
41 Elwood v Goodman [2013] EWCA Civ 1103; [2013] 4 All E.R. 1077, at [37]-[40]. 
42 See Child, “The demise of pure principles” (2010) 243 P.L.J. 14-15. 
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 The doctrine of mutual benefit and burden has been described as a “principle of justice” and 
is said to operate broadly on the basis of fairness.43 This is captured most clearly by Megarry V-
C. in Tito who rationalised the doctrine by reference to a series of everyday, non-legalistic adages. 
According to Megarry V-C., the doctrine was said to hail from: 
 
The simple principle of ordinary fairness and consistency that from the earliest days most of 
us heard in the form “You can’t have it both ways,” or “You can’t eat your cake and have it 
too,” or “You can’t blow hot and cold.”44 
 
It is striking perhaps that a doctrine sitting in such clear conflict with the long-standing and 
celebrated Austerberry rule’s is justified on such slender and colloquial materials and according 
not to legal doctrine but by reference to non-scholastic cliché. Striking also that the potency and 
enforceability of property rights should fall to be determined by reference to a broad construct of 
“ordinary” fairness and consistency; notions which, whilst doubtless central to any functioning 
legal system and to the interests of natural justice, are not the primary drivers of property law. The 
doctrine is said to be supported by the Latin maxim qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus 
which translates roughly as “he who derives a benefit from a thing, ought to feel the disadvantages 
attending it.” This maxim is often cited to buttress the doctrine of benefit and burden on the basis 
that they reflect the same “spirit.”45 Yet, as Megarry V-C. was prepared to concede in Tito,46 the 
relationship between the maxim and a doctrine of mutual benefit and burden is somewhat murky: 
 
This ancient maxim, to be found in 2 Co. Inst. 489, bears an uncertain relationship to the 
principle under discussion. In spirit it is the same: yet the instances of its operation given in 
the books are curiously restricted and haphazard.47 
 
In Halsall, the case which many regard as representing the cradle of the doctrine of benefit and 
burden, Upjohn J. notably failed to scrutinize the doctrine beyond holding that its existence is 
“conceded.”48 This concession is reached by Upjohn J. by reference to a passage taken from 
Norton on Deeds,49 and by drawing on a single observation by Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. on Coke 
upon Littleton at 230b taken from the decision of Elliston v Reacher.50 As a foundation for the 
doctrine, this is exceptionally thin. First, Lord Cozens-Hardy’s observation in Elliston was made 
as part of the address by counsel, did not form part of the judgment and, as a result, does not 
amount legal precedent. Secondly, the particular passage cited by Cozens-Hardy in Coke upon 
Littleton confines quite plainly the benefit and burden principle to cases where a party is 
specifically named in a deed but the deed is not executed. Thirdly, the passage cited from Norton 
                                                
43 See C. Davis, “The Principle of Benefit and Burden” (1998) 57 C.L.J. 522; K. Gray and S. F. 
Gray at note 9 above. 
44 Tito v Waddell (No.2) [1977] Ch. 106 at p. 289 per Megarry V-C. 
45 Ibid., at p. 290. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See H. Broom, Broom’s Legal Maxims, 10th ed. (London, 1939), 482-486. 
48 Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch. 169 at p.180. 
49 Ibid., per Upjohn J. citing R. F. Norton, A Treatise on Deeds: Norton on Deeds, (2nd ed., 
London, 1928), at p. 26. 
50 Elliston v Reacher [1908] 2 Ch. 665 at p. 669. 
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on Deeds itself relies heavily on the authority of Elliston and is therefore unhelpfully circular. In 
addition and strictly-speaking, Upjohn J.’s dicta in Halsall as to the doctrine must also be seen as 
obiter given that, on the facts of the case, a resolution which was passed by the proprietors of land 
allowing for additional calls for charges to maintain the facilities was found to be ultra vires and 
void. The doctrine did not therefore arise. 
Where does this leave us? In defence of the doctrine of benefit and burden, Aughterson51 has 
pointed to a more pragmatic underpinning to the doctrine which, it is suggested, proves eminently 
persuasive. Aughterson notes that the doctrine exists simply to “remove the need for complex and 
inefficient mechanisms devised to circumvent the rigour of the common law.”52 According to this 
view, the existence of the doctrine is less concerned with fairness and is focused on tempering the 
harshness of the traditional Austerberry principle. In particular, the doctrine allows conveyancers 
to avoid the travails of having to devise and sustain an unbroken chain of indemnity covenants; a 
common device used to avoid the Austerberry rule and which permits covenants to be enforced 
indirectly but only where the chain remains unbroken. The doctrine of benefit and burden obviates 
the need to have recourse to the precarity of indemnity covenants. In other words, the doctrine 
exists, pure and simple, as a means of circumventing the strictures of the common law. Of course, 
while this may explain the doctrine’s practical utility, it does not amount to a robust, principled 
justification for the existence of the doctrine. Rather, Aughterson’s pragmatic defence of the 
principle treats the symptoms of the disease but fails to diagnose the cause. More defensible, in 
these circumstances, would be the removal or amendment of the maligned rule. Of course, this is 
the stance of the Law Commission whose reforms, thus far, have languished in the face of 
Parliamentary inertia. Aughterson’s pragmatism is picked up in Megarry & Wade where the 
doctrine of benefit and burden is regarded with skepticism; the authors lamenting the principle as 
a “slight of judicial hand.”53 
 Little assistance or succor for the doctrine is forthcoming from other common law 
jurisdictions. In Australia, the doctrine’s shaky doctrinal foundations have been exposed even 
more unflinchingly. Indeed, the doctrine was rejected outright by the Supreme Court of Victoria 
in Australia and the Northern Territory in Government Insurance Office (N.S.W.) v K.A. Reed 
Services Pty. Ltd54 and Calabar Pty. Ltd v Ampol Pty. Ltd55 after a lengthy consideration and 
evisceration of the provenance of the principle by Brooking J. In the more recent decision of Cooke 
v Dove,56 Bryson J explained that the courts had not reached a final, settled view on the doctrine 
but insisted that, “the principle of benefit and burden had not become established as a general legal 
principle” in Australia.57 
 
 
                                                
51 Aughterson, “In Defence of the Benefit and Burden Principle” (1991) 65 Australian Law Journal 
319. 
52 Ibid. 
53 C. Harpum., S. Bridge., M. Dixon, Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th ed.), p. 
1388 at [32-026]. 
54 Government Insurance Office (N.S.W.) v K.A. Reed Services Pty. Ltd [1988] VicRp 75; [1988] 
V.R. 829. 
55 Calabar Pty. Ltd v Ampol Pty. Ltd (1990) 71 N.T.R. 
56 Clifford v Dove [2003] NSWSC 938; 11 BPR 21,149; [2004] ALMD 4806. 
57 Ibid., at p. 67. 
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V. EXPOSING THE THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND ELEMENTAL FRAILTY OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF BENEFIT AND BURDEN 
 
As this article exposes, the doctrine of benefit and burden evinces a theoretical and “historical 
frailty”58 and the rationale traditionally advanced to justify its operation is based on broad and 
clichéd notions of fairness, of not having one’s cake and eating it. Such a rationale is unconvincing 
as justification for a principle of law. The orthodox rationale offered for the doctrine is founded 
squarely upon maxims; maxims of “fairness”, “justice” and reciprocity. Yet, despite recent judicial 
pronouncements on the increasingly important role of fairness in the context of the quantification 
of beneficial interests in the family home,59 it is argued here that generalized maxims cannot alone 
offer a stable basis for a doctrine which carries with it the potential force of quasi-proprietary 
effect. As Gardner has noted: 
 
statements of legal doctrine sound both more determinate and more authoritative than they 
necessarily are … For it follows that reasoning based on a maxim especially facilitates the 
introduction of unarticulated value-judgments; and indeed that such reasoning carries an 
unusually high risk of actual error, as the judges themselves miss their way.60 
 
Maxims provide an unstable and unreliable foundation for the construction of secure legal 
doctrine.61 As Salmond62 argues, maxims are best regarded as the “proverbs of the law” carrying 
with them the same attributes and defects that do proverbs. Maxims are brief, pithy statements of 
only partial truths. Lord Esher in Yarmouth v France63 went further describing the use of maxims 
as, “almost invariably misleading: they are for the most part so large and general in their language 
that they always include something which really is not intended to be included in them.”64 As Sir 
Frederick Pollock has explained:65 
 
A maxim is a phrase embodying some legal idea of common application in a concise and 
portable form. It is a symbol or vehicle of the law, so far as it goes, it is not the law itself, 
                                                
58 Tito v Waddell (No.2) [1977] Ch. 106 at p. 295 per Megarry V-C.  
59 See in particular Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 and discussion of Stack v Dowden [2007] 
UKHL 17 in M. Dixon, “The Never-Ending Story: Co-Ownership after Stack v Dowden” [2007] 
Conv. 456. 
60 S. Gardner, “Two Maxims in Equity” [1995] C.L.J. 60. 
61 On the maxims, see W.M.C. Gummow and J.R.F. Lehane, Equity-Doctrines and Remedies, 3rd 
ed. (Sydney, 1992), ch 3; P. Jackson, “The Maxims of Equity Revisited,” in S. Goldstein (ed.), 
Equity and Contemporary Legal Developments (Jerusalem 1992); R. Pound, “On Certain Maxims 
of Equity”, in P.H. Winfield and A.D. McNair (eds.), Cambridge Legal Essays (Cambridge 1926), 
at p. 259. Pound suggests that the maxims greatly assisted in the development of equity in the 
United States, where it was regarded with suspicion. Their (frequently spurious) antiquity and so 
authority enabled the results to appear as true law, rather than as the personal opinions of individual 
judges, whilst in practice their lack of determinacy gave scope for judicial innovation. 
62 J. W. Salmond, Jurisprudence, 10th ed. (London 1966), 498. 
63 Yarmouth v France (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 647. 
64 Ibid., at p. 653. 
65 Sir Frederick Pollock, Jurisprudence, 6th ed. (London 1929), 235-6. 
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still less the whole of the law, even on its own ground. One of the commonest mistakes … 
is to take a maxim for an authentic and complete expression of the law, and go about to 
deduce consequences from its words as if it were a modern Act of Parliament. 
 
The “mistake” Pollock outlines describes precisely what has taken place with the doctrine of 
benefit and burden. A general maxim of fairness has been conceded without close exposition of 
its merits. A broad concept of fairness has been accepted, adopted and enlarged into a fully-fledged 
doctrine. With each decided case, this concession has ossified further into a doctrine which is 
consequently weak, largely ungrounded and lacking in a robust and sustainable underpinning. The 
consequence, as this article exposes, is a hollow doctrine teetering on unstable legal footings or as 
Wade described it “a novel and widely generalized proposition” deriving from “some unexplained 
alchemy distilled from an ancient and narrow rule.”66 
 In addition to the historical frailty of the doctrine, in its contemporary application as 
epitomized by Davies, Wilkinson and Elwood, the doctrine betrays an additional, elemental 
fragility or “internal inconsistency.”67 On the one hand, as has been demonstrated, the doctrine has 
been constrained and subjected to narrow pre-requisites such as the requirements of a single 
transaction and that there be an opportunity to reject the benefit. On the other hand, these 
requirements are often themselves loosely-defined and unacceptably vague in application giving 
rise to unpredictability and an absence of legal or doctrinal certainty. The result is a large measure 
of artificiality in the operation of the contemporary doctrine. By way of illustration, since Rhone, 
it has been a requirement that the doctrine can only operate where a party is able to refuse to take 
the benefit and thereby not be fixed with shouldering the associated burden. Yet, this need not 
amount to a real, tangible, practical choice to refuse the benefit but rather can be satisfied by a 
theoretical, conjectural or a mythic conception of whether a party would conceivably have been 
able to elect to receive the benefit or not, in the court’s subjective view. Lord Templeman, in 
seeking to constrain and elucidate the doctrine thus devised what Snape has described as a 
“contextually unconvincing rationalization”68 of Halsall v. Brizell that there must be an 
opportunity to elect whether or not to accept the benefit. Tee,69 discussing the decision in Rhone, 
suggested that this issue of election would likely be the source of much litigation because it raised 
so many questions.70 However, outside the case of Rhone itself, this requirement has been barely 
discussed and is readily assumed to be satisfied in nearly every case in which the doctrine arises. 
In Davies, Wilkinson and Elwood, the Court of Appeal thus reduces the requirement of election to 
almost vanishing point concluding forthwith and, without further analysis, it was “theoretically 
possible”71 for the benefit to be rejected and the burden not undertaken. The requirement is 
therefore so diluted as to be practically almost never determinative of the issue. When any element 
in a legal test is satisfied on the basis of theoretical possibility, its value must surely be doubted. 
The effect is that the application of the doctrine appears to rise and fall chiefly on the basis of the 
requirement of “relevance” between the benefit and burden. This is the heart of the current 
inception of the doctrine. Unfortunately, this requirement, while easily stated, is itself highly 
                                                
66 Wade, note 8 above, at p. 158. 
67 Snape, note 31 above, at p. 86. 
68 Ibid. 
69 L. Tee, “A Roof Too Far” [1994] C.L.J. 423. 
70 Ibid., at p. 448. 
71 Elwood v Goodman [2013] EWCA Civ 1103; [2013] 4 All E.R. 1077, at [25] per Patten L.J. 
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indeterminate and elusive in practice. Pinning down precisely what is to be understood by 
“relevance” is challenging. In both Wilkinson and Elwood, for example, the requirement is 
condensed into a broad and non-specific search for an apparent quid pro quo between the parties. 
Where such a quid and a quo can be identified, the doctrine will apply. Where it cannot be located, 
the doctrine will fall.72 Knowing when such an arrangement will be found is, however, not entirely 
clear and rests on an exclusively case-by-case determination of the wider factual nexus. 
 
 
VI. ENLARGING THE CASE FOR REFORM: CHALLENGING THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS 
PRINCIPLE 
 
The absence of a coherent and convincing rationale for the doctrine of benefit and burden coupled 
with the lack of clarity surrounding the principle’s elemental requirements as established above 
serves only to strengthen the long-standing and strident criticisms of the Austerberry rule against 
the direct enforcement of the burden of positive freehold covenants. Put differently, the doctrine, 
which has only ever offered an indirect and imperfect method for circumventing the harsh 
Austerberry position, is exposed as deeply and fatally flawed thus bolstering the case for reform 
of the law of covenants.73 Whilst there are those such as Snape74 who have argued that such 
indirect methods for the enforcement of freehold covenant burdens can be made to work and are 
therefore “acceptable”, there is doubtless force in Turano’s assertion that “it is undesirable that 
people be encouraged to take circuitous routes to avoid the effect of a legal rule.”75 Far better is to 
challenge and reform the rule. The recent application of the doctrine in Davies, Elwood and 
Kerdene underscores the enduring practical utility of positive covenants and the desirability that 
the burden of such covenants be permitted to run with the land. Given the deficiencies of the 
doctrine of benefit and burden, the case for reform of the law is enlarged. Plainly, however, a more 
direct and coherent scheme to achieve the enforcement of the burden of freehold covenants is 
warranted than the sticking plaster or imperfect “workaround” built on “fictitious (not to say 
preposterous)”76 foundations as Rudden has described. Certainly, the criticisms of the status quo 
of the Austerberry rule are both significant and now very well-rehearsed.77 As Gravells has noted: 
 
                                                
72 As happened in Rhone itself. 
73 Reforms permitting the enforceability of the burden of positive obligations have already been 
introduced in several common law jurisdictions New South Wales, Northern Territory, Northern 
Ireland, Trinidad and Tobago, New Zealand, Hong Kong and more recently in the Republic of 
Ireland. 
74 Snape, see note 31 above. 
75 L. Turano, “Intention, Interpretation and the ‘Mystery’ of Section 79 of the Law of Property Act 
1925” [2000] 64 Conv. 377. 
76 B. Rudden, “Economic Theory v Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem” in J. Eekelaar 
and J. Bell (eds.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 3rd series, (Oxford 1987), at p. 262. 
77 See, for example, E. Cooke, “To restate or not to restate? Old wine, new wineskins, old 
covenants, new ideas” (2009) 73 Conv. 448, at 455–459; Report of the Committee on Positive 
Covenants Affecting Land, (HMSO, 1965); Transfer of Land: The Law of Positive and Restrictive 
Covenants (1984) (Law Com. Report No. 127); Law Commission, Easements, Covenants and 
Profits à Prendre: A Consultation Paper (2008) (Law Com. Report No. 186). 
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Few would dissent from the view that in appropriate circumstances positive covenants 
should be capable of enforcement against successors in title to the original covenantor; that 
enforcement should be through direct means rather than through indirect means, which are 
artificial and frequently unreliable; and that the continued absence of such direct means is 
inconvenient and potentially unjust. Since the House of Lords has now clearly ruled out a 
judicial solution it is for Parliament to provide a legislative solution.78 
 
Yet reform would be no small change. Reform would mean recognising positive freehold 
covenants as proprietary rights in both status and effect and not merely contractual rights as is 
presently the situation. There is much support for this but it is far from uncontroversial. Writing 
in 2009, Cooke, the then Law Commissioner recognised the “growing consensus that there is no 
reason in principle why positive obligations should not be proprietary provided that certain 
concerns are taken seriously.”79 Indeed, this reflects the Law Commission’s latest proposals 
which, in their Final Report in 201180 recommend the introduction of a new form of legal, 
proprietary interest: “the Land Obligation” to replace prospectively81 the current law of covenants 
(both positive and restrictive).82 If implemented, the effect would be that positive freehold 
covenants (albeit re-labelled as Land Obligations) would be positive, proprietary obligations 
capable of registration and, crucially, of being enforceable against successors (provided they 
“touch and concern” the land)83 thus obviating the need for indirect methods of enforcement such 
                                                
78 N. Gravells, “Enforcement of Positive Covenants Affecting Freehold Land” (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 
346, 350.   
79 E. Cooke, note 77 above, at p 460. 
80 Law Commission, Making Land Work: Easements, Covenants and Profits à Prendre (Law Com. 
Report No. 327). 
81 Under the Commission’s proposals, the old law of covenants (including the complex rules for 
the passing of the benefit and burden) continue to apply for those covenants pre-dating 
implementation of the reforms. 
82 Capitalisation of “Land Obligation” sets this latest reform apart from its forerunner which was 
also described as “land obligation” but in lower case. In its 1984 Report, Transfer of Land: The 
Law of Positive and Restrictive Covenants (1984) (Law Com. Report No. 127), the Commission 
had recommended the replacement of the law on covenants with a scheme of land obligations. 
Land obligations would have been legal interests in land, embodying positive and negative 
obligations, segregated by type (positive or negative) and context. The 1984 recommendations 
were not implemented. 
83 Law Commission, Making Land Work: Easements, Covenants and Profits à Prendre (Law Com. 
Report No.327).at [5.23]; Law Commission, Easements, Covenants and Profits à Prendre: A 
Consultation Paper (2008) (Law Com. Report No. 186) at [8.68]-[8.80]; E. Cooke, note 77 above 
at 458. 
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as the doctrine of benefit and burden.84 Whilst gathering much academic support,85 the 2011 
recommendations have thus far also gathered hefty Parliamentary dust and have been rather left 
on the shelf. However, the purpose of this section of the article is not to rehearse the arguments in 
favour of reform – they are accepted almost universally as persuasive. No, the point made is that, 
in rushing to propose reform, a more significant theoretical barrier to reform has been down-
played, under-explored and overlooked. Parliamentary inaction is, arguably, not the most 
significant impediment to the reform of the law in this area. There is a far taller, theoretical, 
property law obstacle to surmount: the numerus clausus principle.86 
 The numerus clausus principle can be seen as sitting at the heart of the debate about the reform 
of covenants relating to land87 and whilst not casting doubt on the precise motivations necessitating 
reform, it does have something to say about whether the proposals of the Commission should be 
adopted. The numerus clausus principle is generally said to hold that there is a fixed or closed list, 
a finite menu, of property rights; a list to which new property rights should be admitted only where 
they are closely analogous to already-recognised property rights and, even then, only where 
compelling reasons are presented as to why such a new right be admitted.88 The numerus clausus 
principle has a long pedigree in legal systems all around the world89 but is surprisingly under-
examined in this jurisdiction. The principle embraces two core aspects:90 first, it provides a 
limitation on contracting parties or individuals’ powers to create novel property rights. Thus, 
contracting parties are not able ,as between themselves, to contract for the creation of a new form 
of property right. It will not be respected and will not carry proprietary effect. As Pollock CB 
observed in Hill v Tupper:91 
                                                
84 The draft Bill defines such obligations as obligations to do something on one’s land or on a 
boundary structure or to make a payment in return for the performance of another obligation. There 
would be no requirement that they be drafted as covenants or that particular words be used in their 
creation. They would be able to bind successors in title, but would also be registrable, so as to 
make publicly available the details of the land that they burden and benefit: Law Commission, 
Making Land Work: Easements, Covenants and Profits à Prendre (Law Com. Report No.327) at 
[1.17]. 
85 See, for example, T. Sutton, “On the brink of land obligations again” [2013] Conv., 17. For a 
contrary view, see P. O’Connor, “Careful what you wish for: positive freehold covenants” [2011] 
Conv., 191. 
86 On which, see generally N. M. Davidson, “Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law” 
(2008) 61 Vand L.R. 1597; B. Akkermans, The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European 
Property Law (Intersentia, Belgium, 2008); J. H. Merryman, “Policy, Autonomy, and the Numerus 
Clausus in Italian and American Property Law” (1963) 12 American Journal of Comparative Law, 
224-31; W. Swadling, “Opening the numerus clausus” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 354.  
87 B. McFarlane, “The Numerus Clausus Principle and Covenants Relating to Land” in Bright (ed.) 
Modern Studies in Property Law Vol 6 (London 2011),  311. 
88 See W. Swadling, “Property” in Burrows (ed) English Private Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford 2007) at 
[4.09], [4.129]; Swadling, “Opening the Numerus Clausus”, note 86 above; T. W. Merrill and H. 
E. Smith, “Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle” 
(2000-2001) 110 Yale L.J. at p. 3. 
89 See Rudden, note 76 above, at 239-245. 
90 McFarlane, note 87 above, at 313. 
91 Hill v Tupper (1863) H. & C. 122 at p. 127. 
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A new species of incorporeal hereditament cannot be created at the will and pleasure of 
the owner of property, but he must be content to accept the estate and the right to dispose 
of it subject to the law as settled by decisions or controlled by Act of Parliament.92 
 
This first aspect was perhaps captured most colourfully and most famously by Lord Brougham LC 
in Keppell v Bailey93 noting that: 
 
Great detriment would arise and much confusion of rights if parties were allowed to invent 
new modes of holding and enjoying real property, and to impress upon their lands and 
tenements a peculiar character, which should follow them into all hands, however remote 
… incidents of a novel kind [cannot] be devised and attached to property at the fancy or 
caprice of any owner.94 
 
The second aspect of the numerus clausus principle serves as a limitation on the court’s power to 
create novel forms of property right. This aspect has been described as “judicial self-governance”95 
or judicial self-restraint. The principle prevents courts unilaterally creating new forms of property 
rights. This is demonstrated in English and Welsh Law through section 1 of the Law of Property 
Act 1925 which offers a fixed and closed list of those estates and interests capable of operate at 
law. Concern has been expressed of a judicial abdication of proper duty if this aspect of the 
numerus clauses principle is observed too rigorously.96 This is not, however, the full picture as 
courts are therefore free to reason analogously with already-existing property rights as part of the 
solution to what Raz identified as “the problem of partial reform.”97 We see just such analogous 
reasoning in the law of easements where easements of car parking have been recognized judicially 
by analogy to long-established easements of way or access.98 
 Reform of the law of covenants in the way suggested by the Commission and the proposed 
creation of a novel property right is an unavoidable challenge to the numerus clausus principle. 
As a corollary, an argument must be made as to how the numerus clausus principle is to be 
overcome. Thus, the “numerus clausus problem” as Rudden has framed it, must be resolved. The 
difficulties standing in the face of the reform of the law of covenants have long been 
acknowledged. Rudden in his famous article99 explored many of the often-cited grounds for 
refusing to permit the passing of the burden of positive covenants: from practical considerations 
(such as the absence of demand, absence of notice and concerns that permitting the enforceability 
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of positive burdens would “encrust” land with layers of obligation) to economic considerations 
(such as the need to avoid hampering and reducing the marketability of land and increases in 
information costs i.e. costs on third parties wishing to discover what rights will be binding on them 
should they acquire property) to philosophical Kantian,100 Austinian101 and Helgelian102 
arguments. For Rudden, these concerns and more can be overcome if positive obligations are 
carefully and clearly defined and subject to the protections of a fully-fledged land registration 
system. Lord Templeman in Rhone expressed the court’s view that only Parliament legislating 
could change the status of positive covenants on the basis that judicial legislation would: 
 
create a number of difficulties, anomalies and uncertainties and affect the rights and 
liabilities of people who have for over 100 years bought and sold land in the knowledge, 
imparted at an elementary stage to every student of the law of real property, that positive 
covenants, affecting freehold land are not directly enforceable except against the original 
covenantor. Parliamentary legislation to deal with the decision in the Austerberry case 
would require careful consideration of the consequences. 
 
Yet, neither Rudden’s analysis nor Lord Templeman’s insistence that only Parliamentary 
intervention can change the law addresses adequately the numerus clausus issue. For, while the 
proposed introduction of a new property right “the Land Obligation” may be regarded as 
“practically convenient and theoretically tidy”103 a strong case must first be made that the closed 
list of proprietary rights be opened and expanded. This is not an altogether simple argument to 
make. Strong grounds exist for not doing so. Indeed, proponents favouring retention of the 
Austerberry rule who argue that it strikes a fair balance between competing interests such as the 
parties’ freedom to contract versus the need to avoid overburdening land and achieve inter-
generational equity, would argue that reform (and thereby opening the numerus clausus) is 
unnecessary.104 A particular difficulty springs from the imposition of positive obligations on 
successors of land that the reform would usher. As Templeman was at pains to highlight in Rhone, 
positive covenants impose an affirmative duty or compulsion to actively do something. As Rudden 
has observed, while “duties-not are frequently imposed on us without our consent [such as in tort] 
… duties-to are not.”105 Permitting the enforceability of positive covenant covenant burdens 
through the “Land Obligation” means imposing on third parties a positive liability to comply with 
the terms of that positive obligation. Imposing positive liability or duty to act in this way has the 
potential to undermine fundamental justifications for recognising property rights such as 
autonomous choice, freedom of contract, privacy and independence.106 This mitigates strongly 
against breaching the numerus clausus. Beyond this, powerful economic and practical reasons 
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have been advanced for controlling and keeping closed the numerus clausus. Merril and Smith,107 
have defended the “deep design feature” of the law of property that property rights come in 
“standardized packages that the layperson can understand at low cost.”108 This, they argue, justifies 
insisting on a strict standardization of recognisied property rights and robust adherence to the 
numerus clausus principle.109 On this view, the principle “makes sense from an economic 
perspective … [it] strikes a balance between the proliferation of property forms, on one hand, and 
excessive rigidity on the other.”110 In this way, the numerus clausus offers protection to potential 
purchasers of land from the cost, uncertainty and effort of discovering how far their prospective 
purchase is encumbered by fragmented property rights. By simplifying the range of rights that 
enjoy proprietary effect, this process is streamlined and the so-called “information costs” of 
enquiries are reduced. Rose,111 another powerful voice resisting any erosion of the numerus 
clausus principle, has argued, in the US context, that whenever the range of property rights is 
widened, the result is not the elimination of problems such as the information costs associated with 
discovery or notice of interests which affect land or land value but in fact has served to re-create 
the same difficulties in new forms, where, for example, land becomes fixed with the burden of a 
positive obligation with little scope to discharge or vary that burden through negotiation of the 
parties. Departure from the “fixed universe” of the numerus clausus therefore requires that a 
convincing case be made. This is particularly apparent in relation to reform of the law of covenants 
where reform, as discussed, will result in the imposition of positive obligations on third parties not 
party to the original agreement creating the right. It is a central concern and tenet of the numerus 
clausus principle that an agreement by contracting parties (or indeed a unilateral act of one party) 
should not be able to impose positive obligations on third parties. This is largely because, as Rose 
has noted, the scope of positive obligations is potentially so limitless: “covenants might potentially 
include anything that might be done on a property … [including that] a jig be done every Monday 
at 8 p.m. on the patio.”112 Such a step requires strong justification. So, how might such a case be 
mounted? More precisely, how can the economic, practical and theoretical difficulties inherent in 
breaching the numerus clausus be overcome? It is this question which has, thus far, in the debate 
surrounding reform of the law of covenants that been largely overlooked. From the Law 
Commission’s recommendations for reform, it is suggested that 3 grounds for breaching the 
numerus clausus principle can be identified. These are 3 inter-locking grounds which we might 
term “safeguards” or ripostes to the arguments against such a move outlined above. These grounds 
are as follows: 
Ground 1: Prevention of an open-ended range of positive obligations capable of burdening land 
through the “filter” of a requirement that only positive obligations which “touch and concern” the 
land will be enforceable as proprietary interests. This, it is said, will prevent land becoming 
overburdened with potentially “unsuitable burdens.”113 
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Ground 2: Registration of both the benefit and burden of positive obligation against land titles 
under the Land Registration Act 2002 as a means of providing publicity to (and thus protection 
for) those prospective purchasers to assist then to discover rights affecting land that may impact 
on issues of whether or not to purchase and on issues of marketability. 
 
Ground 3: Expansion of the jurisdiction of the Lands Chamber under section 84 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 to discharge and vary restrictive covenants to cover variation and discharge of 
positive obligations. 
 
The Commission takes the view that, with such “safeguards” in place, it is able to reform the law 
of covenants in a manner that, “minimise[s] practical and economic risk.” However, the 
overlooked question is, surely, how far these grounds offer the convincing case needed to open the 
numerus clausus? On one view, they do. Certainly, if one takes as a core concern of the numerus 
clausus principle the need to prevent unsuspecting third party purchasers from being bound by a 
potentially unlimited range of novel proprietary interests then the proposal to permit registration 
of the benefit and burden of positive obligations against land titles appears to quash this fear. The 
Land Registration Act 2002 has introduced cheap, efficient and mostly accessible and robust rules 
on registration and notice which must surely allay much of the concern targeted by the numerus 
clausus principle. As Edgeworth has argued, in the Australian context: 
 
[T]he reasons advanced by Lord Brougham [in Keppell v Bailey] and CB Pollock [in Hill 
v Tupper] no longer retain the force they did, as the key mischief they identified for 
retaining the numerus clausus has been removed by Torrens registration systems.114 
 
The point is this: where the existence, scope and nature of positive obligations can be recorded on 
a readily-accessible register for any and all prospective purchasers of burdened and to investigate 
at little cost, such third parties are unlikely to be disadvantages by these obligations and the 
burdened land, rather than constrained and over-burdened may, in fact, be enhanced in value and 
amenity by recognition of such obligations.115 Equally, the proposed extension of jurisdiction to 
permit the discharge and variation of positive obligations also addresses the concern that 
expanding categories of proprietary rights might expose third party successors to burdens that are 
impossible or, at least, very difficult to remove from the land. However, the argument is not all 
one way. Problems remain. The strength of the grounds for opening the numerus clausus listed 
above and, consequently, the potency of the safeguards depends on certain crucial factors: first, 
the “touch and concern” requirement, which the Commission recommend as a means of controlling 
the categories of positive obligations that will enjoy proprietary effect, is highly indeterminate, 
very much at the subjective whim of the court adjudicating the issue and, as the Commission itself 
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concedes, generally “vulnerable to the uncertainties of judicial interpretation.”116 Secondly, the 
failure to adopt the approach of, for example, New South Wales and Northern Ireland where a 
circumscribed list of positive obligations capable of proprietary effect is provided in statute,117 
means uncertainty will persist as to precisely which positive obligations will enjoy proprietary 
status (subject to the “touch and concern” test). Finally, as to the proposal to extend the jurisdiction 
to discharge and vary to positive obligations. This will only prove effective if the jurisdiction can 
be accessed with relative ease, at low cost and without delay. Should this not be possible, the case 
for extending proprietary effect to positive obligations appears rapidly to be ever less convincing 
as land may very well be burdened with additional obligations that prove arduous to remove. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Almost 20 years ago in this very journal, Davis wrote that the doctrine of benefit and burden was, 
“a principle, reasonably clear in its application, that promotes fairness and, consequently, far 
greater use should be made of it.”118 This article has examined the doctrine and found it wanting. 
This article has done three things: it has examined the contemporary scope of the doctrine of 
benefit and burden and has exposed the doctrine as exhibiting both historical as well as elemental 
fragility. The doctrine is one for which a convincing, strong rationale is hard to locate. In so 
identifying, it has been argued that the case for reforming the law of covenants is strengthened. 
However, reform along the lines proposed by the Law Commission such that positive obligations 
become proprietary rights in effect raises a further and hitherto overlooked challenge to the 
numerus clausus principle. The numerus clausus has been described as one of the “driest and 
dustiest”119 aspects of property law and certainly it has been wildly under-explored in the debate 
surrounding reform of the law of covenants. This article has sought to place these issues centre-
stage and, in particular, to highlight that if reform of the law in this area is to introduce, as the 
Commission recommends, a new proprietary right, a clear, coherent and convincing case must be 
made as to why the numerus clausus principle is to be breached. Drawing on the work of the 
Commission, this article has offered an argument as to how such a convincing case might be 
mounted. 
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